The decrease of the Maroni bracket (for example from 60 to 58/59 years old), would mean, in terms of the status quo, an

increase in spending on pensions that would have to be financed through a redis­tribution of resources. This however does not seem to be appropriate, as it would benefit the most favoured age groups who were not affected by the reform in 95; in fact their pensions continue to be calculated with the generous (and very often not equal) payment formula, charged to the youngest generations.

This measure is the central point in the whole reform package, because the contri­butory method's survival depends on it. You cannot claim to be in favour of the method and against the coefficient review: the two positions are not compatible.

On the other hand, it is not redistributi­ve; on the contrary, it does help to establish the social defence system firmly, that is to say, secure elderly people's income.

This means that, on average, every generation should be willing to “pay for” their own pensions.

Obviously among certain generations there will be people who find it difficult to finance an adequate pension with their own contribution.

In these types of cases, the State could intervene at a later stage by providing assistance or at an earlier stage with insu­rance coverage during periods without work, as what happened with the contribu­tory credits during unemployment or leave of absence to look after children or other family members.

The second solution is far better than the first, as it is more equalitarian, much clearer and reduces the discretion that often comes hand in hand with the later political adjustment

What is more the contributory method, when it is applied properly; enables sustai­nable pensions to be paid without removing any elements of solidarity.

Nevertheless is it feasible to ask: is this really the politicians and social actors' objective?

The coefficient review is considered to be like a “cut in pensions” although in reality it would mean, on average, a nice gift of over two years of pension for the generations that are affected by the review, just like the reported increase in the retire­ment age starting from when the coeffi­cients were first established in 1995.

And as there are no such things as gifts in the economy, it would be more of an indiscriminate transfer of wealth in favour of the aforementioned generations

Opposition to the coefficient review is based on the desire to help young people who will not receive such generous contributory pensions. Let's say that, although they are penali­zed in terms of work, they will receive “help” in terms of pensions.

The real help to the youn­gest generations would be to improve the job situa­tion and not help them with pensions. Furthermo­re this gift would not only be available for the most disadvantaged but for

young people in general and this is not fair. Both those who have had a good professio­nal career (after an initial discontinuous period) and also those who have had less success in their working lives will be able to take advantage of it and its financing will be burdened on the generations that haven't even been born yet or on those who are poo­rer than the actual beneficiary.

In this way we would be faced with a new case of “badly applied redistribution” again one which is arbitrarily determined by politics and which is a source of privileges inste­ad of assistance and this is exactly what the contributory method was supposed to eliminate or stop.

The contributory method is trans­parent and drastically reduces dis­cretion in determining the pensions and it therefore pre­vents social and poli

­

tical debate and ne­gotiation.     ~

But do we really want to apply this?     w

Bruno Cecere

(Italy)

THE Italian pension system is very com­plex and detailed. Throughout history many reforms and adjustments have been imple­mented to try and satisfy the demands of both the social actors and workers within a market economy context that has not al­ways been positive.

We are currently going through a period of transition in terms of the payment method which is being turned into more of a contributory method and there is also a great deal of debate between social and political parties.

According to certain minister's state­ments, the reform of the pensions system would mean:

1. Increasing minimum pen­sions.

2. Decreasing the Maroni bracket (increase the early retirement age from 57 to 60).

3. Review coefficients to cal­culate future pensions.

This involves introducing quite heterogeneous measures which if combined into one single packet, apart from becoming even more confusing, could increase the ge­neral uncertainty among the Ita­lians about an issue that is alre­ady complicated. More doubts

would be cast on the future change of the system and attention would be taken away from this reform's real objective.

Out of the three measures the first is clearly related to aid and assistance and should not therefore be included in the pen­sion system reform procedures. Instead it should be linked to the transfer of income intended for solidarity and financed by the general tax system. In reality there is no sense in burdening the increase in minimum pensions on the social contribution, which is a tax that is only imposed on work.

The choice is part of an act of political discretion as it aims to use fiscal revenue for the most disadvantaged groups and ob­viously those who receive minimum pen­sions come within this group.

The second measure affects old age pensions and the social security system. It is however a temporary measure seeing as these pensions are condemned to be pha­sed out as soon as the contributory method is implemented (although there are still a few years to go yet).